Optimal Distribution of Constrained Resources in Bi-contest Detection-Impact Game
Volume 5, Number 1, January 2009 - Paper 4 - pp. 45 - 54
GREGORY LEVITINThe Israel Electric Corporation Ltd.
Post Bag 100, Haifa 31000, Israel
(Received on September 19, 2007, revision available on November 25, 2008)
The paper considers a game between single attacker and single defender. In this game the attacker distributes his constrained resource between target detection and target destruction (impact) efforts, whereas the defender distributes his constrained resource between target counter-detection (camouflage, concealment and decoys) and counter-destruction (protection) efforts. In order to destroy the target the attacker should succeed in both target detection and impact contests. The success probability in each contest depends on the efforts of the agents and is determined by an attacker-defender contest success function. The attacker seeks to achieve the greatest target vulnerability (probability of destruction). The defender seeks to minimize the vulnerability. The paper studies the optimal resource distribution as solution of non-cooperative minmax game between the two agents.
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